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A Split by Any Other Name ...
Procter Hug, Jr. t and Carl Tobiast
INTRODUCTION

We applaud the contribution that the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (White Commission) has
made to the public debate regarding how the federal courts of appeals
can cope with the demands of ever increasing caseloads and no new
judicial resources. 1 The White Commission has conscientiously
discharged its challenging assignment in the very brief period which
Congress allotted. We believe, however, that a careful review of the
Commission's research reveals no significant evidence of dysfunction in
any court of appeals, and certainly none sufficiently severe to warrant its
ultimate recommendation to restructure the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals into three autonomous adjudicative divisions. We submit that
the Commission has not met its burden of persuasion for such sweeping
change. Therefore, we urge Congress to authorize the Ninth Circuit,
which has been the acknowledged national leader in experimenting with
innovative methods of resolving large caseloads, to continue and expand
upon that record of successful experimentation.
In this article, we suggest that those who propose to change a
successful, century-old institution must bear the burden of persuasion
regarding the need for modification. In the first section of this article,
we explore some of the principal concerns that the members of the
Commission, as well as certain observers of the Ninth Circuit, have
raised during the study process. In the second section, we show that, by
standard measures of judicial administration and performance, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is operating as well as or better than the

t ChiefJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
t Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We wish to
thank Mark Mendenhall, Assistant Circuit Executive, for invaluable assistance in the preparation of
this article as well as Eleanor Davison for processing this piece. Professor Tobias wishes lo thank
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Jim Rogers for his generous, continuing support. These
remarks are those of the authors, although they reflect the position of two-thirds of the members of
the Ninth Circuit.
I See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAlS, FINAL
REPORT ( 1998) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT).
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other courts of appeals which were not the focus of the White
Commission's recommendations. The next section reviews how the
untested restructuring proposed by the Commission will cause more
problems than it was intended to fix. Finally, in the fourth section, we
offer a constructive alternative approach that the Ninth Circuit has
already implemented. We examine the work of the Ninth Circuit's
Evaluation Committee, which is developing innovative solutions to
address many of the same concerns that the Commission sought to
alleviate through its restructuring proposal. Through more modest
modifications to court operations, the Ninth Circuit will be able to
maintain its flexibility and adaptability in order to meet the caseload
demands of the next millennium. We conclude by suggesting that
Congress authorize the Ninth Circuit to continue experimenting with
measures that promise to enhance court operations.

I. WHAT wAS THE COMMISSION TRYING To Fix?
The origins and development of the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals do not require exposition
here because other authors, in this journal and elsewhere, have
comprehensively explored them. 2 Drawn.from the Commission's series
of six public hearings, surveys of judges and appellate lawyers, and
receipt of written comments, its final report includes a summary of the
arguments that proponents· and critics of circuit-splitting have
articulated in the longstanding debate over the Ninth Circuit. These
claims and counterclaims "concern the effects of the size of the court of
appeals, its geographic jurisdiction, and the court's place within the
federal appellate system." 3
Among its findings were, first, that advocates of circuit division assert
that the Ninth Circuit's size precludes it from functioning in a timely
and effective fashion. 4 Second, proponents of circuit-splitting claim that
the court cannot maintain a consistent, coherent, and predictable body
of circuit law.5 Third, those who favor bifurcation question the ability of
2 See, e.g.,Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A Farmer Cl.erli's View o/tlie Proposed Ninth Circuit
Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 875 ( 1998); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49
FLA. L. REV. 189 (1997).
3 Final Report, supra note 1, at 34.
4 See id.
5 See id. at 34-35.
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the court to perform its en bane function efficiently, principally because
it is thought to convene too few en bane proceedings to foster the
development of stable circuit law. 6 Fourth, circuit division proponents
contend that the size of the court's geographic jurisdiction undermines
regionalism and frustrates effective court operations. 7 In its attempt to
evaluate these allegations, the Commission concluded that:
We have reviewed all of the available objective data routinely used in
court administration to measure the performance and efficiency of the
federal appellate courts, but we cannot say that the statistical criteria tip
decisively in one direction or the other. While there are differences
among the courts of appeals, differences in judicial vacancy rates,
caseload mix, and operating procedures make it impossible to attribute
them to any single factor such as size. 8
The commissioners correspondingly consulted "subjective criteria,
such as consistency and predictability of the law [which] are obviously
more difficult to evaluate but are widely regarded as a high priority for
the courts of appeals." 9
The commission members frankly
acknowledged that they lacked adequate time to conduct a statistically
meaningful analysis of Ninth Circuit decision making to reach an
objective determination of how the court compares with others, and
they eventually concluded that uniformity and predictability defy
statistical evaluation. 10 We, however, believe that a careful examination
of court management statistics and available empirical research over the
past ten years convincingly demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals is operating within the mainstream of the federal appellate
courts and that it is efficiently and effectively maintaining control ofits
caseload.

II.

WHAT OBJECTIVE AND EMPIRICAL MEASURES DEMONSTRATE

We have assembled below-<:overing the last ten years-a compilation
of six of the objective criteria routinely used to compare core court of
appeals operations. They relate to the time it takes to resolve appeals,
the amount of workload per judge, the volume of opinions that judges
6 See id. at 35.
7 See id. at 36.
8 See id. at 39.
9 Id.

IO See id. at 39-40 (citation omitted).
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need to keep up with, and the circuit's reversal rate by the United States
Supreme Court. Although other issues relating to consistency and
predictability of decision-making are much more difficult to measure
and are not routinely collected by the courts, we have cited some
additional empirical research on these topics. We submit that, when
these major concerns are viewed from the perspective of objective
operational data and scientific inquiry, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals fares as well as or better than the other eleven geographic-based
circuits in the nation.
Delays in resolving cases are measured through median time
intervals. Median time intervals in cases terminated after hearing or
submission have been maintained in the courts of appeals for decades
and serve as a starting point for comparing the circuits. 11 Median time
interval charts further subdivide the time from filing a notice of appeal
to final disposition into four subparts: (1) the time from filing a notice
of appeal to filing last brief; (2) the time from filing of last brief to
hearing or submission; (3) the time from hearing to final disposition;
and ( 4) the time from submission (without oral argument) to final
disposition. 12 The latter two categories are important as they are the
only two categories over which the judges themselves have full controlthat is, the cases are in their hands for resolution. The first segment
depends largely upon timely action by the lawyers. The second depends
upon prompt filling ofjudicial vacancies to assure the sufficient number
ofjudges to maintain regular calendars for hearing appeals. A glance at
these time intervals over the past ten years demonstrates several points:
•Ninth Circuit times from filing of notice of appeal to
final disposition have remained relatively consistent,
ranging from a high of 16.0 months (after the 1989
earthquake closed the courthouse) to a low most
recently of 13.8 months, while the national median has
gradually increased from 10.1 months to 11.6 months. 13
Generally, the Ninth Circuit's median time from filing
the notice of appeal to final disposition has averaged less
than four months longer than the national median time
11 See 1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS viii.
12 See 1998ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 111-13.
13 See 1989-1998 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP'S. (Median Time
Inteival Charts) 111-13.
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(except in 1989-1992, when the court was forced to
relocate because of the earthquake). 14 The most recent
figures show that the Ninth Circuit's median is only 2.2
months longer than the national median. 15
•

The District of Columbia, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have frequently reported higher median
times than the Ninth Circuit over the ten year
period. 16

•

The judges in the Ninth Circuit are among the fastest
in the nation in terms of the median time from
hearing to final disposition, varying from 1.6 to 2.8
months, usually in the top third among the circuits.17

•

Similarly, Ninth Circuit judges are among the fastest
in the nation in the median time from submission to
final disposition, varying from .1 to .9 months, which
places them usually in the top quarter of the
circuits. 18

It is all the more remarkable that the court has been able to maintain
its pace of case dispositions and output of published opinions since it
has experienced a one-third reduction in the number of active judges.
The Ninth Circuit has generally operated with between four and ten
vacancies since 1994, reflecting a significant diminution in judicial
resources available to handle its growing caseload. 19 Innovations in
caseload management, increases in mediated settlements, and generous
contributions by senior and visiting judges have prevented the court
from falling as far behind as the numbers appear to indicate. There
comes a point of diminishing returns, however, when heavy and
unremitting reliance on these resources can no longer continue to

14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.

18 See id.
19 See FINAL REPORT, supra note l, at 30.
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produce the results the court requires to operate effectively. The Ninth
Circuit believes strongly that with a full complement of active judges, its
performance would improve even further and eliminate much of the
concern raised before the Commission.
One indication of judicial workload is the number of case
terminations on the merits per judge, a figure that is a standard
objective measure of the workload levels of the courts of appeals. These
numbers have increased over time as federal appellate caseloads have
expanded and no new judges have been added to handle the increases.
However, there appears to be no correlation between the size of the
court and the number of merit terminations per judge. A review of ten
years of statistics reveals several findings:
•

Ninth Circuit merit terminations per judge have
increased from a low of 25 7 in 1988 to a high of 518 in
1997, while the range for all circuits has fluctuated
between a low of 173 and a high of 792. 20

•

For five of the past ten years, the number of Ninth
Circuit merit terminations per judge has hovered within
30 cases of the median range for all courts, placing the
Ninth Circuit output at the level deemed most
appropriate for a federal court of appeals. 21

•

For most of the years in the decade, the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had the highest
numbers of merit terminations per judge, reflecting the
exceptionally heavy caseload burdens in those circuits.22

An additional comment heard in connection with the Ninth Circuit is

that the volume of published opinions is so large thatjudges and lawyers
have trouble keeping current with the development of new circuit law.
A review of the figures for the past ten years shows:

20

See 1989-1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (Overall Caseload Statistics Tables)

21
22

See 1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 20.

26.

See id. at 26.
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In the Ninth Circuit, the number of published opinions
has fluctuated between a high of 986 and a low of 682
per year, with no particular trend toward increasing or
decreasing significantly during that period. 23

•

Nationwide, the range of published opinions has varied
from a low of 232 (the low figure has almost always
reflected the output of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals) to a high of 1,079, with the Ninth Circuit
generally on the high end of the range.2 4

•

The Ninth Circuit's output of published opinions has
remained relatively constant during a period in which
the number of cases filed in the court has more than
doubled. 25

•

The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have occasionally
exceeded the output of the Nin th Circuit and generally
issue only 100 fewer opinions per year than the Ninth
Circuit. 26

403

In the electronic age, however, the relevance of the number of
written, published opinions to the debate is questionable. First, the
volume of published opinions does not correlate with circuit size. For
example, in 1998, three other circuits issued more published opinions
than did the Ninth Circuit. 27 Second, the White Commission states that
~e Ninth Circuit's large volume of published opinions makes it
"impossible for all the court's judges to read all the court's published
opinions when they are issued" and implies that the volume is so large
that it hampers judges from being able to "monitor the decisions of all
panels of the court so that their own decisions are consistent with earlier
decisions of the court. "28

23 See 1989-1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (Table on the Types of Opinions or
Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs) 54.
24 See id.

25

See id.

26 See id.

27
28

See id.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
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Professor Arthur Hellman, in his written testimony to the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, suggested
that the Commission's reliance on this theory is misplaced.
Distinguishing between keeping up with circuit law and monitoring
panel opinions, he wrote,
Keeping up with circuit law is something done by
individual judges . . . . With all circuit law now easily
retrievable by computer when it is needed, there is no
particular reason for individual judges to acquire
familiarity with decisions that have no relevance for any
of their current cases .... Monitoring panel opinions, in
contrast, is something that the court does as an
institution .... But effective monitoring does not require
that all judges keep up with all opinions. As long as each
opinion receives some scrutiny by off-panel judges, the
objectives can be met. ... One would think that, other
things being equal, an annual output of 800 opinions
could be monitored more easily by 28 judges than by 14 .
. . . The larger the number of judges engaged in the
monitoring process, the greater the likelihood that a
particular error or inconsistency will catch the eye of at
least one member of the court. 29
The Ninth Circuit's relatively high rate of reversal in the United
States Supreme Court has also been mentioned by some as cause for
concern, requiring circuit restructuring. A look at the ten year reversal
rates reveals:
• The number of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed each year
by the United States Supreme Court is usually in the 1624 range and has never exceeded 30 cases, representing
less than one-half of 1 percent of merit terminations by
the Ninth Circuit.30

29 Oversight Hearing on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts ofAppeals Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on thejudiciary,

106"' Cong. 7 (1999) (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law) [hereinafter Hellman Statement].

30 Sll NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS LAW LIBRARY TABLE ON UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT REVERSAL RATES 1 ( 1998) [hereinafter Reversal Rate Table].
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•

For most years, the Ninth Circuit has had the highest
number of cases selected for review by the Supreme
Court- sometimes three or four times more cases than
other circuits. 31

•

In only one year in the last ten did the Ninth Circuit
have the highest reversal rate of all of the circuits. For
three years its reversal rate was lower than the median
for all circuits, and for two years its rate was within eight
percentage points of the median.32

•

The Supreme Court generally reviews cases with an eye
toward reversal, as the median reversal rate for all years
except two exceeded 50 percent, and the overall reversal
rate exceeded 60 percent in five of the ten years under
consideration. 33

405

However, the relevance of the Supreme Court reversal rate to matters
of court of appeals administration and configuration is questionable.
The concept of judicial independence is threatened when the
substantive decisions of a court serve as the basis for circuit division or
realignment, ostensibly for the purpose of changing the outcome of
decisions before the court. The Commission itself recognized this
principle in its statement: "It is wrong to realign circuits ... and to
restructure courts . . . because of particular judicial decisions or
particular judges. "34
For many years observers have also raised concerns about the ability
of a large court to maintain coherency, consistency, and predictability in
its case law. With no time to conduct its own study and no routinely
maintained court data to review, the Commission seemed to throw up its
hands by saying: "But when all is said and done, neither we nor, we
believe, anyone else, can reduce consistency and predictability to

31 See The Honorable Jerome Farris, Tiie Ninth Circuit- Most Maligned Circuit in the Country - Fact
or F"iction1, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1465, 1465-66 (1997), for an insightful examination of the circuit's
reversal rate for 1997.
32 See Reversal Rate Table, supra note 30, at 4.
33
34

See id. at l.
FINAL REPORT, supra note l, at 6.
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statistical analysis." 35 Without more, however, the members of the
Commission then concluded that "large appellate units have difficulty
maintaining consistent and coherent law" 36 and leapt to their ultimate
determination that such coherence "is best fostered in a decisional unit
that is small enough for ... close, continual, collaborative decision
making .... "37 The divisional restructuring proposal is the result of that
reasoning.
What the Commission apparently rejected in reaching its conclusion
was systematic empirical research that found that inconsistency in the
law is neither a serious problem in the Ninth Circuit nor a factor of
circuit size. An objective, highly praised scholarly study of consistency of
the law in the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the pattern of [multiple
relevant precedents] exemplified by high visibility issues ... is not
characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally.
Nor is
intracircuit conflict." 38 A subsequent national study by the Federal
Judicial Center reached a similar conclusion when it stated, "In sum,
despite concerns about the proliferation of precedent as the courts of
appeals grow, there is currently little evidence that intracircuit
inconsistency is a significant problem. Also, there is little evidence that
whatever intracircuit conflict exists is strongly correlated with circuit
size." 39
We believe that the objective operational data and empirical evidence
show that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is and has been operating
as well as or better than the other circuit courts of appeals across the
country. No evidence has been produced to demonstrate any
dysfunction or inability to deliver qualityjustice and coherent, consistent
circuit law that would justify circuit restructuring of the magnitude
proposed by the White Commission. Those who propose dramatic
alteration to a century-old institution, which now resolves appeals
promptly, fairly, and consistently and that operates efficiently, must bear
the burden of proving that such a change is necessary and will better
deliver appellate services than the time-tested methods and structure

35 Id. at 40.
36 Id. at 47.
37 Id. at 40.
38 RESTRUCTURINGJUSTICE: Tm: INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTI I CIRCUIT AND THE FuTURE OFTI IE
FEDERALCoURTS86

(ArthurD. Hellman ed. 1990).

39 JUDITl-1 MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATM:S FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF

APPEALS 94 (1993).
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that have worked so well in the Ninth Circuit and in all of the other
courts of appeals across the country. Indeed, the Commission candidly
admitted that Ninth Circuit administration was at least equal to that of
other circuits and "innovative in many respects." 40 Critics of the Ninth
Circuit, therefore, must conclusively demonstrate that the court is
operating so ineffectively as to deserve a remedy as radical and untested
as the divisional approach. These critics, as well as the Commission, have
not sustained this burden.

Ill. THE FLAWED DMSIONAL SOLUTION
The centerpiece of the Commission's Final Report is the
recommendation that Congress require the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals to implement a divisional arrangement, and authorize the
remaining courts to apply this approach when they attain a certain
size. 41 The Commission proposed that lawmakers create three divisions
for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 42 Each of these divisions would
hear appeals arising within its geographic jurisdiction, each would have
its own en bane process, and each would function autonomously in that it
would not have to follow precedent issued in the other divisions. 43 The
Commission also suggested the establishment of a Circuit Division which
would resolve "square inter-divisional conflict" 44 between two divisions.
The preceding section shows that the Commission did not prove that
the Ninth Circuit experiences difficulties which require remediation,
especially with a solution as dramatic and disruptive as the divisional
approach appears. 45 Even if, for the sake of argument, the Commission
had clearly shown that the Ninth Circuit faces the problems to which the
members of the Commission alluded, the Commission failed to
demonstrate that the divisional arrangement would remedy those
complications. The divisional proposal is a drastic idea which no federal
appeals court has ever adopted, which would disrupt effective aspects of

40 FINAi. REPORT, supra note l, at ix.
41 See id. at iii, x, 40-47, 60-62.
42 See id. at 41.
43 See id. at 41-43.
44 Id. at 45.
45

See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 2; see also Procter Hug, Jr., 171e C,ormnission on
Structural Allemalives for lite Federal Courts of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of lite Commissions
Recom1nendalionsfor the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887 (1999).
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current Ninth Circuit administration, and which might well exacerbate
the very conditions that it is intended to address. Indeed, Second
Circuit ChiefJudge Ralph Winter wrote the Commission expressing his
court's "strong and unanimous opposition" to the divisional notion
while stating that there is no experience with the divisional idea and that
the courts are "hardly working so badly that ... resort to a very different
and untested form of organization is called for. "46 The chief judge
asserted that the divisional approach would "lead . . . to more
incoherence in case law," would increase forum shopping, and would
require more judges. 47 The essential question is whether the
recommended change achieves the goal of "having a single court
interpret and apply the federal law in the nine western United States
and the Island Territories in an efficient and effective manner." 48
Perhaps the critical flaw in the divisional scheme is its abandonment
of the concept of circuit-wide stare decisis, a rule of law which is crucial
to the maintenance of a consistent, coherent, and predictable body of
circuit law in the Ninth Circuit and in every other federal court of
appeals. 49 Under current practice, threejudge panel decisions are
binding throughout the circuit and on all subsequent panels, unless they
are overruled by the court of appeals en bane or by the Supreme Court. 50
"The limited en bane procedure provides a mechanism whereby all
judges can participate in the en bane process through a variety of
different procedures including: the 'stop clock' procedure, requests for
en bane, memos circulated to the entire court arguing for and against en
bane review, and by a vote of all of the active judges on whether to take a
case en banc."51
The divisional arrangement abrogates circuit-wide stare decisis and,
thus, jeopardizes uniformity, coherence and predictability. 52 "Each
regional division would function as a semi-autonomous decisional
unit." 53 This would affect present operations in two important ways.
46 Letter from Chief judge Ralph K. Winter, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to
Justice
Byron
White
(Nov.
5,
1998)
(last
modified
Nov.
16,
1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/Winter.pdf>.
47 Id.

48 Hug, supra note 45, at 887.
49 See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 2; su also Hug, supra note 45, at 909-10.
50 See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 3.
51 Hug, supra note 45, at 888.
52 Su Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 3; s,,e also Hug, supra note 45, at 909-10.
53 FINAL REPORT, supra note l, at 43.
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First, the proposal would eliminate the circuit-wide en bane process; en
bane courts in each division would perform that function. 54 Second,
panel and en bane decisions of the divisions would have binding effect
only within each division, essentially creating three separate circuit
courts. 55
The Commission also suggested a Circuit Division "whose sole
mission would be to resolve conflicting decisions between the regional
divisions," that is, those opinions which present "square interdivisional
conflicts." 56 It is important to appreciate that the authority of the
Circuit Division is sharply circumscribed. First, the notion of square
conflicts is so narrow that jurisdiction will rarely be invoked. Second,
only the parties to a case can invoke jurisdiction and "only after the
panel decision ha[s] been reviewed by the division en bane or a
divisional en bane ha[s] been sought and denied."57
The Circuit Division concept would also impose additional
disadvantages that do not currently exist. One general difficulty is that
the proposal could foster incessant wrangling and time-consuming
satellite litigation over what actually constitutes a "square inter-divisional
conflict" that triggers the jurisdiction of the Circuit Division. 58 The
divisional recommendation would also effectively institute another level
of appellate review, thus imposing greater cost and delay in resolving
disputes.
The divisional concept would also have a particularly detrimental
impact on litigation in the state of California. The Commission
proposal places the Eastern and Northern Districts of California in the
Middle Division and the Central and Southern Districts of California in
the Southern Division. This means that different interpretations of
federal law could apply within different parts of California. 59 For
example, if the Middle and Southern Divisions ruled differently on a
challenge to a statewide initiative in California, the state and those
individuals and entities subject to state authority might be obligated to
comply with inconsistent legal decrees. This situation would undermine
uniformity and respect for the law, would cause confusion for attorneys
54
55
56
57
58
59

See id. at iii.
See id. at 43.
Id. at 45.
Id.

See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 3.
See Hug, supra note 45, at 898.

410

Journal ofLaw & Politics

[Vol. XV:397

and litigants, and would increase forum shopping within California to
secure favorable rulings. An alternative proposal to place all of
California in its own division would isolate the development of its law
from that of its economic partners, and it would not spare the state from
the stare decisis defects of the divisional proposal.
In sum, the divisional arrangement will not remedy the problems that
the Commission stated it would address, and, instead, the approach will
have numerous deleterious consequences.
Even though the
Commission expressly stated that circuit division was not warranted for
any circuit, including the Ninth, the divisional proposal effectively
constitutes a split of the Ninth Circuit. It is also important to appreciate
that the divisional approach may be irrevocable. Once the divisional
idea is implemented and circuit-wide stare decisis is abandoned, it may
be extremely difficult to return to the status quo and, thus, outright
circuit splitting may be inevitable. Fortunately, there is a readily available
approach that promises to be more effective and less disruptive than the
divisional arrangement. That approach is the Evaluation Committee
and its suggestions for improving Ninth Circuit operations. We explore
it next.

IV. THE EVALUATION COMMITTEE APPROACH
Although there are serious flaws in the divisional restructuring
proposal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that some observers have
raised concerns regarding the circuit with the White Commission. Any
circuit would be remiss if it failed to take such concerns seriously, assess
their validity, and take appropriate steps to remedy them. That is exactly
what the Ninth Circuit did in January 1999 when it appointed a
distinguished ten member Evaluation Committee "to examine the
existing policies, practices, and administrative structure of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in order to make recommendations to its
judges to improve the delivery ofjustice in the region it serves." 60 This
approach, the court believes, is a far more responsible manner of
addressing and resolving legitimate concerns than the imposition of a
disruptive and untested restructuring with countless unanticipated and
potentially counterproductive side effects.
The Evaluation Committee, chaired by Senior CircuitJudge David R.
Thompson of San Diego and consisting of circuit judges from all of the
60 See"Notice and Request for Comment," July 13, 1999 (source available with the authors).
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administrative units, a representative of the district court bench, a
prominent scholar of the federal appellate courts, and an experienced
appellate practitioner, 61 has been meeting regularly for the last year to
investigate and study concerns and issues raised in relation to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. It has focused on consistency of decisions,
regional sensitivity, productivity and delay, and the en bane process. In
addition to meeting regularly and reviewing research work from its staff
attorneys, the Committee has heard from academics and has conducted
bench-bar focus groups at a variety of locations in the circuit to obtain
the views and suggestions of the Ninth Circuit bar. It has also widely
circulated a detailed call for comments from judges, lawyers, and other
interested parties from across the circuit and across the country.
The initial results of this initiative have been encouraging. As the
process is an ongoing one, it should continue to yield positive benefits
for circuit operations for years to come. In the area of consistency of
decisions, we have already noted the lack of any objective evidence that
Ninth Circuit decisions are subject to greater inconsistency than those in
other circuits. We believe that any conflicts among decisions that have
occurred have been resolved by the circuit's en bane process. However,
the perception still remains that such a large circuit cannot avoid
inconsistencies with so many panels issuing so many opinions.
The Committee has focused its efforts on increasing the court's
ability to recognize potential or perceived conflicts early and address
them directly arid immediately. To obtain assistance, the Committee has
widely circulated to the bench, bar, and law schools within the circuit, a
call for help in identifying perceived conflicts among its unpublished
memorandum dispositions and among published opinions and
unpublished memorandum dispositions. The court is also considering
an experiment to relax its citation rules to permit counsel to cite to
unpublished memorandum dispositions for their persuasive value or to
highlight conflicts between a published opinion and an unpublished
disposition.

61 In addition to the chair, the committee members are Chief District Judge David A. Ezra of
Honolulu, Ninth Circuit Judge Michael Daly Hawkins of Phoenix, Professor Arthur D. Hellman of
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Assistant United States Attorney Miriam Krinsky of Los
Angeles, Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Edward Leavy of Portland, Ninth Circuit judge M. Margaret
McKeown of Seattle, Ninth Circuit judge Thomas G. Nelson of Boise, Ninth CircuitJudge Mary M.
Schroeder of Phoenix, and Ninth Circuit Judge Kim M. Wardlaw of Los Angeles.
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Two other Committee ideas in this area which the court of appeals
has implemented include establishment of an "electronic mailbox"
through which judges and lawyers can notify the court of perceived
conflicts, and the use of staff attorney specialized expertise to spot
potential conflicts and sensitive decisions and bring them to the court's
attention for extra scrutiny.
The Committee is also experimenting with the regional assignment of
judges in response to various concerns about the need for a regional
perspective in appellate decision making. The court has already
adopted and implemented a recommendation that at least one judge
who resides in the administrative unit (northern, middle, southern)
where the case originated be assigned to the appellate panel hearing
that case. The court also is experimenting with holding more panel
sittings in additional cities across the circuit and combining them with
bench-bar activities to increase outreach to and communication with all
parts of the region.
The court has achieved substantial increases in productivity from the
use of its innovative motions and screening calendars. Every month a
screening panel of three judges sits in San Francisco to consider less
complex cases that can be easily resolved by the application of clearly
defined circuit precedent. These screening panels will decide an
average of 340 motions and dispose of an average of 140 appeals on the
merits. With more judges, the court could increase this output. The
Committee is also considering other approaches to increase productivity
that include increased "batching" of cases with common issues before
the same argument panel for quicker dispositions (something that is
being done now but would be expanded on a larger scale) and
designating "lead cases" in which the panel decision would affect a
whole series of subsequent cases with a common issue. The court is
expected to experiment with these and other combinations of proposals
to see if it can continue to make gains in productivity without the benefit
of additional resources.
The Ninth Circuit also believes its unique limited en bane process is an
efficient and effective use of scarce institutional resources which
operates in a manner that respects the needs and interests of each judge
to have a role in the process of declaring circuit law. After a threejudge
panel has rendered its opinion in a case, any judge on the court,
including a senior judge, may call for a rehearing en bane and write
memos in support of the call. Within certain time limits, all judges may
write memos for or against the en bane call. This results in an insightful
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exchange where every active and senior member of the court is able to
express a view on the call and on the underlying substantive legal issues
in the case. After a prescribed period of time for this exchange, all of
the active judges on the court vote on whether to take the case en bane.
If a majority is not attained, it represents a decision of the full court that
the panel opinion should stand. By tradition and understanding in the
Ninth Circuit, limited en bane decisions are fully accepted by the court as
being the final decision of the court as a whole. Since 1980, when
Congress authorized the court to employ the limited en bane process,
there have been more than 170 limited en bane decisions, one third of
which were unanimous and three quarters of which were rendered by a
majority of 8 to 3 or greater. This is a strong indication that a full en
bane court would have reached the same decision.
The Evaluation Committee recognizes that some observers perceive
that the en bane decision may not reflect the views of all of the judges
because not all of the active judges sit on the en bane court. The
Committee enlisted the assistance of a distinguished group of academic
scholars from the economic, political science, and statistics disciplines to
advise it on the issue of representativeness. They concluded that the
court could achieve approximately 93 percent representation of the
views of all of the judges of the court if the limited en bane court
consisted of seven judges; increasing that number to eleven judges
achieved a representational percentage of approximately 95 percent
(and 13 yielded 96 percent). Nonetheless, the court is as concerned
with perception as it is with reality, and the Committee has since
recommended an increase in the size of the en bane court.
Some observers, including the United States Department ofJustice
and the CircuitJustice, have suggested that the court take more cases en
bane each year. A statute currently requires a majority vote of the active
judges to take a case en bane. 62 In the United States Supreme Court, just
under a majority vote (4 of 9) is sufficient to grant certiorari, and the
Committee is exploring a similar device to take a case en bane. Both of
these proposals, relating to the size of the en bane court and the vote
required to go en bane, along with the requirement of geographical
representation on all panels mentioned above, are the subject of
proposed legislation by Senator Dianne Feinstein. 63 The court has voted
62 See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
63 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals En Banc Procedures Act of 1999, S. 1403, 106th Cong.
(1999).
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to endorse Senator Feinstein 's bill as a reasoned, responsible alternative
to the radical resuucturing proposed by The Federal Ninth Circuit
Reorganization Act of 1999. 64 Anticipating that the number of en banes
will increase in the future, the court has adopted a new procedure, on
an experimental basis, for the en bane court to sit quarterly throughout
the year to keep pace with the additional hearings required.
This is a sampling of the myriad issues explored and acted on by the
Evaluation Committee as the court seeks to fashion appropriate
responses to perceived concerns about its operations. The process is an
ongoing one and reflects the Ninth Circuit's continuing commitment
and willingness to re-evaluate itself and to further the process of
experimentation and innovation that will lead to even greater efficiency
and effectiveness in the years to come.

V. CONCLUSION
The White Commission conscientiously discharged its challenging
responsibilities in the brief time allotted by Congress. However, its
research has produced no substantial objective or subjective evidence of
dysfunction in Ninth Circuit administration or court of appeals
operations that would warrant the Commission's preference for smaller
decisional units. The Commission's proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals into three autonomous divisions to achieve smaller
decisional units is a drastic, untested, and flawed approach that will lead
to less, rather than more, uniformity, consistency, and coherence in the
development of circuit law.
The Ninth Circuit itself is seriously considering the concerns raised
by the Commission. The Ninth Circuit has created an Evaluation
Committee to reassess thoroughly every aspect of the court's operations.
The measured approach of the Evaluation Committee, as distinct from
the disruptive and untested remedy of divisional restructuring, is a much
more responsible and flexible solution that is grounded in the best
aspects of what has worked in the past and will succeed in the future.
We urge Congress to follow carefully the work of the Evaluation
Committee and to support its approach through legislation that
authorizes the circuit to continue and expand its experimentation with
innovative measures to address the large appellate caseload.

64 S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999).

